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DAILY FREE PRESS CO. v. SAME.
While those damages which depend on the sound discretion of a jury are not
susceptible of any accurate regulation by the court, yet the jury should be .prevented
Dy proper caution from acting upon improper theories as to the legitimate elements
to be considered in estimating them.
The term "1exemplary or vindictive damages," should not be used without such
explanation as may prevent a jury from being misled by it. For voluntary wrongs
additional damages are allowed for injured feeling, but nothing beyond the individual grievance should be taken in account in estimating them.
If different agencies have concurred in -producing a private grievance, the liability of each person for tuch portion of the damages as is allowed for injured
feeling should be measured by the extent of his own misconduct.
While the mischief which may be caused by an abuse of the press is such as to
render its conductors responsible for great care in guarding against the danger,
yet the necessities of civilization require that no unreasonable or vexatious restrictions shall be imposed upon them.
The character and doings of private persons, not developed in legal proceedings
or voluntarily made public, cannot properly be discussed in print; and for all
libels, every publisher, whether an individual or a corporation, is responsible to
the extent of any special damage, and any estimated damage to credit and reputation. But he is only liable for such damages to injured feeling as must inevitably
be inferred from the libel itself, published in a paper of such character and circulation d his, if he has used such precautions as he reasonably could, to prevent such
an abuse of his columns.
The employment of competent editors, the supervision by proper persons of all
that is to be inserted, and the establishment and habitual enforcement of such rules
as would probably exclude improper items, should exempt a publisher from any
aggravation of damages on account of the express malice of his subordinate, for
any libel published without his privity or approval.
But if it should appear that he was wanting in reasonable care to prevent abuses,
he would be liable to increased damages for his own misconduct, which might
fairly be regarded as identifying him with faults which he took no pains to
suppress.

Enton to Wayne circuit.
This was an action for damages for the publication of an alleged
libel concerning plaintiff.
The plea was the general issue with notice of justification.
I We are indebted for this case to Hon. J. V. CAIPBELL.-ED. A~m. Law
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Ward & Palmer, for plaintiffs.
William P. Wells, G. V. N. Latkrop, and William Gray,
for defendant.
Opinion by
CAMPBELL, J.-These cases come up on the same questions,
the action below in each of them being for libel, and the charge
in each having been identical in all its legal bearings.
The errors alleged refer to the rule of damages, which, it is
claimed, was so laid down as to subject plaintiffs in error to be
charged with exemplary damages, and this they insist was not
authorized as the case stood before the court and jury Their
corp6rate character is relied on among other things as modifying
xnd limiting their responsibility. It is not urged that-a printing
and publishing company engaged in the issuing of a newspaper
and established .for that purpose is not responsible to all -persons
injured by the publication of a libel. But it is claimed that those
damages which are enhanced by -the misconduct of individual
agents of the company, stand on a different footing from those
which might be recovered against the individual chiefly active in
Qriginating- the slanderous article ; and that, in submitting the
case to the jury, sufficient care was not taken to discriminate. It is not very easy to lay down definite rules for discriminating
damages in those cases where they depend upon the sound discretion of a jury. And yet it is necessary to prevent the jury, as
far as may be, from acting upon improper theories of what should
be regarded, in estimating the elements which go to make up the
injury to be redressed. When their attention has been carefully
directed,their conclusions must be aceepted, unless io perverse
or mistaken as to be entirely incofisistent with justide.
The law favors the freedom of the press, so long as it does not
interfere with private reputation, or other rights entitled to protection. And, inasmuch as the newspaper press is one of the
necessities of civilization, the conditions under which it is required
to beconducted should not be unreasonable or vexatious. "But
the reading public are not entitled to discussions in print upon tl~e
character or doings of private persons, except as developed in
legal tribunals, or voluntarily subjected to public scrutiny. And,
since an injuri6us statement inserted in. a popular journal does
more harm to the person slandered than can possibly be "Wrought
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by any other species of publicity, the care required of such jour
nals must be such as to reduce the risk of having such libels
creep into their columns, to the lowest degree which reasonable
foresight can assure.
The danger and the precautions necessary to prevent it, are
directly connected with the business itself; and all who voluntarily assume the responsibility must exercise it under similar
conditions. It is the *rightof the citizen to be secure against all
unlawful assaults; and no distinction can be reasonable which
a'lows the care required in the conduct of any avocation, attended
by risks to third persons, to be varied by the private or corporate
character of its conductors. Any injury which is avoidable by
the perpetrator-or, in other words, any injury which is not in
some degree accidental-entitles the injured party to redress.
And any damage to person or reputation is recoverable, to such
extent as in the opinion of a jury, not led away by passion or
prejudice, the nature of the injury will warrant.
But in all cases where an act is done which from its very nature
must be expected to result in mischief, or where there is negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or
safety of others, a new element of damages is allowed to be considered. A serious wrong which is the natural and direct result
of voluntary action, necessarily indicates a v6luntary wrongdoer,
for the law rigidly holds all persons to the presumption that they
intend such results as are to be expected from their conduct, whenever those results arrive. Where the-wrong done consists in a
libel-which can never be accidental-the P.ublishing is therefore
always imputed to a wrong motive, and that motive is called
malicious. And, in the absence of any testimony showing the
origin and circumstances of the publication, it stands before the
jury as a voluntary wrong, until palliated or excused, while the
actual motive, whether intensifying or mitigating the moral guilt,
may be shown to qualify it.
If evil motives arising out of ill will or revenge are shown, the
moral guilt of the perpetrator will be very much enhanced. If
such motives are negatived, the evil quality of the act will in like
manner be reduced, and it will appear to all persons much less
reprehensible.
It is in connection with the various degrees of blameworthiness
chargeable on wrongdoers, that discussions have arisen upon the
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6ubject of vindictive or exemplary damages, which, inasmuch as
they rest upon actual fault, are by some authorities said to be.
designed to punish the wrong intent, while, according to others,
the damages usually so called are only ineant to recompense the
sense of injury which is in human experience always aggravated
or lessened in proportion to the degree of perversity exhibited by
the offenders. While the term exemplary or vindictive damages
has become so fixed in the law that it may be difficult to get rid
of it, yet it should not be allowed to be used so as to mislead ;
and we think the only proper application of damages beyond
those to person, property, or reputation, is to make reparation for
the injury to the feelings of the person injured. This'is often
the greatest wrong which can be inflicted, and injured pride or
affection may, under some circumstances,. justify very heavy
damages. In all libel cases this injury to the feelings is a proper
element to be considered, in addition to the damage to reputation
and other attendant grievances. And on the same principle anything 'having a tendency to reduce the extent of the voluntary
wrong is to be considered in mitigation by the jury. The injury
to the feelings is only allowed to be considered in those torts
which consist of some voluntary act, or very gross neglect, and
practically depends very closely on the degree of fault evinced
by all the circumstances. It has beei very wisely left t6 the jury
to determine each case upon its own surroundings, because the
only safe rule of damages in matters of feeling is to give wlat,
to the ordinary apprehension .of imparti l men, would seem prportionate to an injury which must beZneasured by the instincts
of our common humanity. And it will at once be perceived that
where different persons or agencies have concurred in producing
an injurious result, although all may be responsible for some
damages for injured, feeling, as well as for the more substantial
mischiefs of another sort, yet. they, may stand in very different
positions of moral wrong.
There is no doubt of the duty of every publisher to see, at all
hazard, that no libel appears in his paper.. Every publisher is
therefore liable, not only for the estimated damages to credil and
reputation, and such special damages as may appear, but also'for
such damages on account of injured'feeling as must unavoidably
be inferred from such a libel, published in a paper of such a position and circulation. But no further damages than these should
VOL. XVI.-3O
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bt. given, if he has taken such precautions as he reasonably c6ull
to. prevent such an abuse of his columns. When it appears that
the mischief has been done in spite of precautions, he ought to
have all the allowance in his favor which such carefulness would
justify, in mitigation of that portion of the damages which is
awarded on account of injured feelings.
The employment of competent editors, the'supervision by pro
per persons of all that is to be inserted, and the establishment and
babitual enforcement of such rules as would probably exclude
improper items, would reduce the blameworthiness of a publishet
to a minimum, for any libel inserted without his privity or appro
val, and should confine his liability to such damages as include
no redress for wounded feeling beyond what is inevitable from
the nature of the libel. And no amount of express malice in his
employees should aggravate damages against him, when he has
thus purged himself from active blame.
If, on the other hand, it should appear from the frequent recurrence of similar libels, or from other proof tending to show a want
of solicitude for the proper conduct of his paper, that the publisher was reckless of consequences, then he would be liable to
increased damages, simply because of his own fault he had deserved them. By such recklessness be encourages fault or carelessness in his agents, and becomes in a manner in complicity with
their misconduct.
Wiile, therefore, in the present case, the reporters were guilty
of carelessness in receiving hearsay talk of legal charges which
could only be lawfully published if in accordance with the documentary facts, and while there could be no justification for publishing outside scandal against an individual, from any source
whatever, yet the defendants were only responsible, beyond the
damages recoverable under any circumstances for such a libel, to
the extent of their own conduct, in the care or want of care used
in guarding their columns against the insertion of such articles.
We have no means of judging whether the verdict of the jury
was based upon any idea of the personal fault of the publishers,
and we have no authority to pass upon its propriety in either view
ot the facts.
But there is room for the ground taken by the plaintiffs in
error, that the charge of the court left it in the power of the jury
V) hold them in all respects identified with the faults of their
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agents. Upon this ground we think the charge must be regarded
as calculated to mislead the jury, and we must, therefore award
a new trial.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
FARMERS AND MECHANICS' NATIONAL BANK v. GIRARD
INSURANCE AND TRUST CO.
A sale under a writ of partition is a judicial sale, and discharges the lien of
judgments and of a mortgage by one of the tenants in common of his udivided
portion.
Such mortgage is discharged in Pennsylvania although it be a first mortgage and
have priority of all other liens. The Acts of 1830 and 1845 only preserve. the
lien of sucnh mortgage from discharge by sale under a writ of ezecution.
What irregularities in the proceeding for partition will not vitiate it. -

CERTIFIcATE from Nisi Prius.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The question raised by this record is, whether
the lien of the mortgage of Paul D. Geisse to the Farmers, and
Mechanics' Bank, on his undivided -third of the lot in dispute,
was divested by the sale made by order of the District Court, in
the action of partition brought by one of the tenants in common
against his co-tenants ? The plaintiffs contend that the lien'of
their mortgage was not disturbed by the sale, for two reasons.
The first is, that the proceedings in the action of partition were
so defective and irregular that in law they are a nullity as to the
one undivided third mortgaged; and the second reason is, that it
is not the law that a mortgage given by one of .several tenants in
common upon his undivided interest is discharged by a sale in
proceedings in partition, instituted and duly conducted by one
of the other tenants in common. It must be admitted that the
proceedings in the action of partition, the .effect of which is now
under consideration, were in some respects irregular. Whdther
there was anything worse than mere irregularity - anything
requiring us to- hold that all the tenants in common were not
bound by the action of the court, we will proce'ed to inquire.
The plaintiffs insist that the District Court had not jurisdiction
of all the parties, and particularly of the. owners of that third
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which had been mortgaged to them. At the time when the writ
was sued out, the owners of the land were Augustus Henry
Geisse, who owned one undivided third; Augustus H. Denckla,
who held one-third as a trustee of Anna M. Everley; and Clara
Geisse, a minor, who owned the other third subject to a life
estate in her mother, Clara A., alleged to, have been married
to Wilder. In the action, Augustus H. Geisse was the
plaintiff, and the defendants named were Christian H. Denckla
(afterwards amended by substituting Augustus for Christian),
trustee of Anna M. Everley, Wilder, and Clara his wife,
and Clara Geisse, a minor. Service of the writ was accepted
by Denckla, and as to the other defendants, the sheriff returned
"cn-Ril habent, and published as commanded once a week for six
weeks," &c. By the express provisions of the 1st section of the
Act of March 26th 1808, and the 4th section of the Act of April
11th 1835, this was an effectual service of the writ upon the
defendants as to whom the sheriff returned "1 nihi labent," and it
brought them .within the jurisdiction of the court. It is a mistake t6 argue, as has been argued, that because Clara Geisse was
a minor, under the age of fourteen years, service of the writ upon
her could only be made by service upon her next of kin, as required by the Act of June 13th 1836, relative to real actions. The
service spoken of. by that act is personal. The requirement has
no rqference to cases where the defendants cannot be found in the
county. Service in such cases is provided for by other Acts of
Assembly. And in this case the legal effect of the sheriff's return
is that there was no one in the county upon' whom service of the
writ against the minor could be made. Besides this, after the
return, and after a declaration had been filed, setting forth the
title of all the parties, the court expressly determined that it
appeared service had been made according to the provisions of
the Act of Assembly, and they gave judgment.
Again, it is objected that the writ did not designate
Wil
der, the husband of the tenant for life, by any Christian name.
and therefore that the publication of the substance of the writ
could not have been notice to him or to his wife, or to the mort
gagees, of her interest. It is to be observed that this objection
is urged by a lien-creditor, and urged collaterally to the record.
It is not made by any of the parties to it. But a lien-creditor is
not entitled to notice of proceedings anterior to the sale of the
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property on which his lien rests. Neither Wilder nor his wife
ever complained that they were not parties to the record, and
were not duly summoned to appear. It is useless to discuss the
question how far third persons, who had no right to be heard in
the case, can object to the omission of the Christian name of one
of the defendants. Certainly they cannot, if the court had juris.
diction over the parties by any name, and, having such jurisdi6.
tion, gave judgment de terris. There is no analogy between
misdescription of the names of parties in an action of partition,
and misnomer of parties on a lien-docket. The effect of the latt'er is due to statutory requirement. A lien-docket is part of a
system of statutes against frauds; but the substance of a writ
of pirtition is notice to the parties in interest to appear. We
hold, therefore, that the omission of the Christian name of Wilder, if he had one, did not prevent the court from obtaining jurisdiction over him and his wife, by the publication made by the
sheriff;
Nor- is there anything in the objection that the summons
required only Christian H. Denckla (as amended Augustus H.
Denckla) toL appear. There are clerical errors in the writ; but
the fair construction of it is that it was directed*t'o all the tenants -in common, except the plaintiff. The writ was so served.
The court adjudged that service had been' made upon all, and
determined the interests of -all, giving judginent ihat the part
of each should be set out in severalty. We hold, then,'thit notwithstanding some faults and mistakes, which it is now too late
for any of the parties to take advantage of, the District Court
had jurisdiction of all the parties in interest.
The plaintiffs- next object that there was no* judgment
"quoad partitio fiat,'" which was a necessary pre-requisite to
either partition or a sale. But this is a mistake. None was
entered upon the appearance-dodket until after the sale was made.
The absence of such an entry. does not disproye the existence of
a judgment. One was entered upon the court minutes, and that
is sufficient. The neglect of the prothonotary'to transfer it to
the appearance and lien dockets, at the time when it was entered , .
did no injury to the parties, nor to any person.
That the proceedings were not copied at length into the partition-docket, as required by the Act of April 25th 1850, it is
hardly necessary to say, can have no effect upon the sale made
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under the order of the court. It was not the purchaser's duty to
see that they were transcribed, and he had acquired his title befor6
the transcript could be made.
These are the principal objections urged against the validity
of the proceedings in partition, as against the owners of the undivided third of the lot mortgaged to the plaintiffs. There are
some minor ones, which have no weight. In view of them, we
think that the proceedings in partition cannot now be successfully
assailed, either by Mr. and Mrs. Wilder or Clara Geisse, much
less by the plaintiffs, who are strangers to the record.
We come then to the more general question whether a sale in
partition by writ discharges the lien of a mortgage on the undivided
interest of one of the parties. A sale in partition is always for
the purpose of enabling division. It is authorized only when it
has been determined that the land which is its subject cannot
be divided according to the command of the writ " without prejudice to, or spoiling the whole." When that appears the law
directs a sale in order to convert that which is impartible, into an
equivalent that is capable of distribution. Such a sale is eminently
judicial, more strictly so than is a sale by a sheriff under an execution. It is made under an order of the court, its subject is in
the hands of the court, and the proceeds are necessarily brought
into court for distribution. The Act of -1799 requires that the
moneys or securities, realized from the sale, " shall be brought
into court," to be distributed. The whole proceeding is more
directly the act of the court than in any other sheriff's sale, where
the officer acts under instructions of the attorney, and where he
may and often does distribute the purchase-money of the property
sold without any supervision or direction of the court. That
Orphans' Court sales in partition are judicial sales, was decided
in Sackett v. Twining, 6 Harris 202, and recognised in Jacobs's
Appeal, 11 Harris 477. I am not aware that it has been directly
decided whether a sale in partition by writ in a common-law court
is judicial or not, though Allen v. aault, 3 Casey 473, substantially rules that it is. But without any positive determination, it
is impossible to doubt that it is to be so regarded. It certainly
has everything which in other cases is regarded necessary to make
a sale judicial, and it is even less under private control than
almost any other which is confessedly such.
Next it is to be observed that judicial sales in this state dis-
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charge all liens. This is a rule of almost universal application.
There are indeed some exceptions to it, created by express statutory enactment, and others growing out bf the peculiar character
of the lien or encumbrance, but it has long been regarded as
sound policy, that property purchased at a judicial sale should
pass into the hands of the purchaser clear of all mere liens.
Exceptions to the rule are allowed only from necessity. If property be thus sold the chances are greatly increased that it will
bring its full value, thus benefiting alike, the owners and lienSales. in partition have never been recognised as
creditors.
exceptional, and it is not easy to discover any reason why they
should be. In them it is as much for the interests of the owners
of thb land, and for holders of liens upon it, or parts of it, that
purchasers shall not be compelled to look after encumbrances, as
it is in any other judicial sale. And encumbrancers have 'the
same notice that.is given to them in ordinary cases of sales under
a venditioni exponas. They have no reason to complain, therefore, if their liens be discharged from the land, and attached to
,its full equivalent, the proceeds of the sale. Surely a sale in
partition should not be taken out of the general rule which regulates judicial sales, and their consequences, without some controlling reason. Exceptions are not to be multiplied unnecessarily.
There is a close analogy between proceedings in partition in
the Orphans' Court, and proceedings in partition by writ. The
object in both is the same, and the modes of a ccomplishment are
not unlike. Yet there is no doubt that under an Orphans' Court
sale in. partition the entire interest of an heir passes -to the purchaser, who takes it disencumbered of all liens. In Commoiwealth
v. Poole, 6 Watts .82, it was held that liens might be satisfied out
of the proceeds of sale. This wQuld have been impossible, had
the sale in that case not worked an entire conversion. And tho
Act of March 29th 1832, though it did not expressly enact that
sales in Orphans". Court partition shall divest liens, recognised
that such must ble the effect. The 49th seption declared that, "in
all cases where, in consequence of proceedings' in partition, the
share, or any part thereof, of an heir in real estate shall, be cohverted into money, either by reason of the impracticability, or
inequality of partition, or by virtue of a sale or otherwise, the
Orphans' dourt 'before making a final decree confirming the partition, or sale as aforesaid, may appoint, a suitable person as
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auditor, to ascertain whether there are any liens or encumbrances
on such real estate, affecting the interests of the parties; and if
it shall appear by the report of such auditor, or otherwise, that
there are such liens, the said court may order the amount of
money which may be payable to any of the parties against whom
liens exist to be paid into court, and shall have like power as to
the distribution thereof among the creditors or others as is now
exercised by the courts of common law, when money is paid into
court by sheriffs or coroners.'
In their remarks upon this sec"tion the commissioners to revise the Civil Code speak of it as an
act of justice to possessors of encumbrances upon the interests of
heis in real estat6, "which being converted into money by proceedings in partition, the security of the encumbrances becomes
seriously impaired." If sales in Orphans' Court partition divest
liens upon the interests of the parties, certainly sales in partition
by writ must work the same result. It is impossible to find any
reason for a distinction. None is found in the fact that the Act
of 1799 allows.the sheriff to take securities, instead of money, for
the-sum bidden at the sale, for he must bring the securities into
court, where they are to be treated as a substitute for the land.
Besides, it has been held that in some cases an Orphans' Court
may decree a sale on time: .Davis's Appeal, 2 Harris 871; Bailey's Appeal, 8 Casey 40. The court can deal With securities
taken as with' inoney.

It is worthy of notice that though the question before'us has
not been hitherto expressly decided by'this court, the practice to
distribute the proceeds of sale in common-law partition among
lien-creditors of the parties has been. partially sanctioned. In
Browne v. Browne, 1 P. A. Browne's Rep. 97, it was assumed
that in such a case the sheriff could not safely distribute the
money among the parties without ascertaining -what liens were
upon the estate. There were judgments against some of the parties to the partition in that case, which the sheriff paid, or retained
money to pay, and he was allowed for searches for judgments and mortgages. In Willard v. Norri8, I Rawle 64, this
court, remarking upon the case of Browne v. Browne, observed
that "nothing could more clearly show how notorious is the rule
that in every judicial sale in Pennsylvania, the land goes to the
purchaser clear of all judgments and mortgages, and that out of
the purchase-money, the sheriff, at his own risk, is to pay off all
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these liens according to their priority, insomuch that though the
Act of Assembly about partitions makes no mention of liens, yet
by analogy, drawn from the notorious usage of the commonwealth,
an allowance was adjudged to the sheriff for the fees paid for
searches for judgments and mortgages, the owners of which might
afterwards call upon him for their money."
In addition to this, the argument from the inconveniience of
selling subject to encumbrances upon the interests of some of the
parties is not without weight. In many cases it would render
partition practically impossible. It would produce great diffidulty and uncertainty in the distribution, and it would exhibit the
anomaly of a right conferred by one tenant in common superior
to that which he ever possessed. It is trife some of these inconveniences may exist, even if encumbrances be discharged, as
where there are ground-rents, or liens fixed by statute on the undivided intetest of a party.' Such are- inevitable, but'they present no-reason for adding others not necessary.
For .these reasons we hold that a sale made in partition by writ
under the Act of 1799 does discharge the lien of judgments and
mortgages upon the land sold, having the ordinary effect of other
judicial sales. The consequence of this is thathe 'lien of the
plaintiffs' mortgage upon the undivided third of the lot in dispute
was discharged by the.sheriff's sale in partition, made in Novem.
ber 1858, and their purchase under a judgment* subsequently
obtained upon it, without notice to the purchasers at the former
sale; gave them no title against them or those claiming under,
them.
We cannot yield assent to the argument that the lien of !he
mortgage was preserved by the Act of April 6th 18aO, and its
suppleme'nt of April .16th 1845. - The first referred only to sales
made by virtue of any writ of v' enitibni exponas, and the supplement extends the provisi6ns of'the act to all cases of sales
made by virtue ,nrauthority of any writ of execution. The word
execution has aiways been understood as meaning a writ to give
possession of a thing. recovered, by judgnent or decree. -It is
clearly'distinguishable from a mere order of sale. The legislature
doultless intended to use the word in the sense in which it was
commonly received.. No one supposes that a first mortgage is
not; discharged by a sale under an order of the Orphans' Court.
Yet an order of sale by the Common Pleas., in an action of partt.
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tion, is no more an execution than is an order of sale for the pay
ment of debts, or for partition in the Orphans' Court.
We need add nothing more. From what has been said it will
sufficiently appear that in our opinion, there was error in giving
judgment at Nisi Prius for the plaintiffs.
The judgment is reversed, and judgment is given on the
point reserved for the defendants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
STERLING HOLCOMB v. KATE B. ROBERTS, ADxuX.
An administrator may sue for breach of contract made with his intestate, although
the breach occurred after death of the decedent and before" grant of letters of
administration.
In cases where it is necessary for the purpose of supporting the rights of the
intestate and for the benefit of his estate, letters of adinistration relate back to
the death of the intestate.
WRIT

of error to Common Pleas of Warren county .

The opinion of the court was delivered by
READ, J.-The plaintiff's intestate purchased from the defendant the oak timber on lot No. 185, in Pittsfield township, -and
paid him for it. In the spring of 1864, P. J. Taft, as the agent
and by the authority of Kate B. Roberts, the widow of J.L.
Roberts, the intestate, cut and made a -considerable quantity of
staves without objection by the defendant. But when he commenced to haul them to the Roberts mill, at Pittsfield, he was
forbidden, and finally arrested on a capias in trespass, issued by
defendant, and this prevented him from removing the staves.
Letters of administration on the estate of J.L. Roberts were
issued to his widow, the plaintiff, on the 10th August 1864, and
this suit was brought to recover damages for this breach of contract; and the first question is, can it be maintained by the
administratrix, and does the grant of the letters of administra.
tion in this case relate back to the death of the intestate, and
place her in the same condition as if she were an executrix ?
The leading cases on this subject are our own case of Leber v.
Kauffelt, 5 W. & S. 445; Thorpe v. Stallwood, 5 M. & G.
760 (44 E. C. L.) ; and Poster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226, cited

HOLCOMB v. ROBERTS.

and approved in Rockwell v. Saunders, 19 Barb. 480, and Priest
v. Watkins, 2 Hill 225.
An administrator may maintain an action of tresliass for taking
away the goods of his intestate after his death and before the
grant of the letters of administration. "It would be strange,
indeed," says C. J. TINDAL, "if an administrator might sue for
a trespass committed in. the lifetime of his intestate, and for one
committed after the grant of letters of administration, but not for
one committed in the intermediate time :" 5 M. & G. 773.
So where a person having sent a quantity of goods abroad for
sale, died intestate, and after his death the defendants purchased
the goods from the agent of the deceased there, who sold them
for the benefit of the intestate's estate, and, subsequently to the
sale, the plaintiff took out letters of administration to the intestate, and sued the defendants for the price of the goods, it was
held, that the action was maintainable ;_ that the title of an administrator, though it does not exist until the grant of administration, relates back to the time of the death of the intestate, so
as to entitle the administrator to sue in assumysit for goods sold
and'delivered; and that as the act of the agent-was ratified by
the plaintiff after he became administrator, it was no objection
that the intended principal was unknown at the time to the person
who intended to be the agent: 12 M. & W. 226.
So where a note belonging to the estate of an intestate was paid
to his widow, who afterwards took out letters of administration,.
it was held they related back, and legalized the payment: 2 Hill
255. In Leber v. Kauffelt, Judge SERGEANT says: '.' There are
cases in which, for the benefit of the estate, and to sUpport the
right, the law makes letters of administration relate back to. the
death of %he intestate, so as to render the intervening acts done
by the administrator valid and'binding. The distinction, therefore, seems to be, that the relition Back will be admitted for the
purpose of supporting the rights of the intestate, and of ratifying acts for the *benefit of his estate, and giving a remedy where
otherwise there would be none."
These principles cover, the present case, and the court wete
therefore right in negativing the defendant's point, "that there
can be no recovery. unless it appears that after the granting of
letters of administration he refused to permit the plaintiff to take
the timber in accordance with the contract."
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The two other specifications of error are to the charge of the
court, in which we perceive no error under the circumstances
mentioned by the judge.
Judgment affrmed.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
INDIANAPOLIS AND CINCINNATI RAILROAD CO. v. RUTHERFORD.'
It is negligence fora passenger in a railroad car to allow his arm to project out
of the window, and if he receive injury from such position he cannot recover.
The railroad company is not bound to put bars across its 'Windows to prevent
passengers from putting their limbs out.

forgan Circuit Court.
Suit was brought by Rutherford against the company for injury
done him, whereby his arm was broken, the elbow being projected
at the time out of the car window. The train, in passing on a
side track, was compelled to run close to a water-tank, and against
one of the heavy timbers of this his arm struck, causing the
injury. In the court below, the plaintiff obtained a verdict for
$700.
APPEAL from

Oyler &.Howe, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FRAZER, J.-[After disposing of some questions in regard to
pleadings and instructions.]
The judgment cannot stand. Nothing'is better settled than
that in such a case, if the plaintiff's negligence has directly contributed to the injury, he cannot recover. A passenger is as much
bound to use reasonable care to avoid injury, as the carrier is to
use the greatest degree of skill and care to save the passengers
from harm. Nor does the duty of the carrier extend to the
imprisonment of the passenger, so as to prevent the latter, by his
recklessness or folly, from voluntarily exposing himself to need.
less peril. Though a passenger, he is nevertheless a free man.
I We are indebted for this case to Oyler &Howe, Esqs., appellants' counsel.EDS. Axs. LAw REG.
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Ralway coaches are provided with windows to promote the health
of passengers, by affording light and ventilation, and that the
tedium of a journey may be relieved in some degree, and its pleasures enhanced, by viewing the objects along the route. The
place for the passenger is inside, not outside, of the coach, and
this is well known to everybody who ever saw a railway coach.
The carrier is no more bound to barricade the windows to prevent
passengers from extending their limbs outside, than he is to lock
the doors to prevent them from going from car to car, when the
train is in motion, and thus voluntarily subjecting themselves to
ihe dangers obviously incident to that act of recklessness. The
same reason which would require the one thing, would also require
the 6ther-nay, it is not easy to see why it would not require that
Lhe passenger should be so restraindd of his liberty in every
respect that he could not by any act of his own, put himself in
unnecessari'daxiger. Such a power in railroad officials must
exist, if the duty to exercise it exist. The obligation to answer
in damages cannot be separated from the authority to do what is
.necessary to avoid liability. The law recognises no such duty as*
resting upon carriers of passengers, nor have they any authority
to exercise such unreasonable and annoying power over those
whom they carry. Their passengers -are not their slaves, nor are
the latter absolved from the duty of using ordinary care for their
own safety. Unwarranted, officious, and' insulting interference
with the liberty of passengers by railroads had proceeded in this
state to such a point, that the legislature, at its last session,
deemed it necessary to interfere, and impose severe penaltiesto
prevent one form of the annoyance: Acts of 1867, p. 165.1
The propositioia put -forth by the court below for the guidance
of the jury, that it is the duty .ofthe carrier to barricade coach
windows, &c., finds some sanction in The New slersey Railroad
Co. v. Kennard, 21 Penn. St. 203; but it is so entirely at.variance with*the weight of authority, and with elementary principles,'
that we cannot recognise it as good law.. Holbrook v. Schenectady Railroad Co., .12 N. Y. 236, is also relied upon by the
appellee as sustaining the court, but in our opinion that.case is
very far from it. There was a controverted question whether the
plaintiff's arm was inside or outside of the car when the injury

I This refers to the lopking of car-doors while the irain is in
LAw REG.

motion.-Es. Am.
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oc6urred. The court below had charged the jury that the railroad
company only contracted to carry the passenger safely, provided
she kept within the cars-that it was for the jury to say whethei
her elbow was out of the cars at the time it was injured; and if
it was, then it was a fact from which they might infer want of
ordinary care on her part. The defendant nad moved the court
to instruct that if the jury found that the plaintiff's arm was out
side the window when the injury was received, it was an act of
negligence, and she could not recover. The chief question in the
.Appellate Court was whether the refusal of this instruction was
error. That it was a correct statement of the law was not questioned in the Court of Appeals, either in the irgument or in the
opinion of the court. Indeed, the opinion is quite to the contrary; but there was held to have been no error in its refusal,
for the sole reason that the lower court had .charged the jury
substantially in accordance with the request, and was right in
declining to repeat it.'
It cannot be necessary to cite authorities in support of the
views .upon t6is subject already aiznounced in this opinion. We
content ourselves with a reference to Todd v. The Old Colony
Railroad Co., 8 Allen 18, and The Catawissa Railroad Co. v.
Armstrong, 49 Penn. St. 186, for a clear and forcible statement
of the law upon the subject as it has been lofig settled.
Judgment reversed, with costs. Cause remanded for
new trial.
In Zintsburgy, &-c., Railroad Co. v.
McClurg, ante, p. 277, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania having occasion
to consider the same point, came to the
same view of the law, as the court in the

preceding case, and- expressly overruled
the case of New Jersey Railroad Co.
v. Kennard, 9 Harris 203, which bad
decided differently.
J. T. M.

8upreme Court of JBlinoi8s.
COLE v. VAN RIPER.
The Illinois Statute of 1861 giving a married woman exclusive control of her
property, declaring that the same shall "be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed
by her, the same as though she was sole and unmarried," and exempting it from
execution or attachment for the debts of her husband, does not give to her the
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power of conveying her real estate without the consent of her husband manifestel
by joining in the deed.
Although the effect of the statute is substantially to abolish the life estate of the
husband in his wife's lands, during their joint lives, accruing to him by virtue of
the marital relation, and also to abolish, during the life of his wife, his tenancy by
the courtesy in her lands, in all cases where the title has been acquired by her
since the passage of the statute, it does not abolish the tenancy by the courtesy
after the wife's death, but leaves it unimpaired in the husband.
THIS was an action of ejectment, and the question presented by
the record was, whether, under the law of 1861, known as the
Married Woman's Act, a married woman can convey real estate,
acquired since that time, without the joinder of her husband.
That act provides:
"That all the property, both real and personal, belonging to any married
woman, as her sole and separate property, or which any woman hereafter married,
owns at the time of her marriage, or which any married woman, during coverture,
acquires in good faith, from any person other than her husband, by descent, devise,
or otherwise, together with all rents, issues, increase, and profits thereof, shall,
notwithstanding her marriage, be and remain, during coverture, her sole and
separate. property, under her sole control, and be held, owned, possessed, and
enjoyed by her, the same as though she was sole and unmarried; and shall not be
subject to the disposal, control, or interference of her husband, and shall be
exempt from ekecution or attachment for the debts of her husband."

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The legislature has here used very sweeping
language, but it must be interpreted with.reference to the evil
intended to be cured, and in such manner as to be made to harmonize"with other statutes which are left tinrepealed, so far as such
harmony can be secured without disregarding the. legislative
intent. It. is a familiar maxim, that repeal, by implication'- is
never favored.
That this statute cannot be enforced, according to its literai
terms, without impairing, to a veiy large extent, the strength of
the marriage tie, will be evident on"a moment's reflection. By
the terms of the act the property of a married woman is to be
"uder her solo control, and to be held, owned, possessed, and
enjoyed by her the same as though she ws sole-and unmarried."
If this -language is to receive a literal interpretation, a married
woman, living with her husband and children, in a house owned
by her, would have the right to forbid her husband to enter upon
the premises, 'and he would be a trespasser in case he should enter
against her will, and would be liable to her in damages. Such
LAWRENCE,
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,vould be her rights as a feme sole.

The wife could thus divore6

her husband a mensa et thoro, without the aid of a Court of Char,
cery. Or, again, suppose in a house thus owned and occupied,
the furniture is also the wife's property, can sie forbid the bus
band the use of such portion as she may choose, allow him zG
occupy only a particular chair, and to take from the shelves of tue
library a book, only upon her permission ?. This would be all
very absurd, and we know the legislature had no idea of enacting
a law to be thus interpreted. It is simply impossible that a woman
married should be able to control and enjoy her property as if she
were sole, without leaving her at libety practically to annul the
marriage tie at pleasure; and the same is true .of the property of
the husband, so far as it is directly connected with the nurture
and maintenance of his household. The statute cannot receive a
literal interpretation.
The object of the legislature was not to loosen the .bonds of
matrimony, or create an element of constant strife between hus.
band and wife, but to protect the latter against the misfoitunes,
improvidence -or possible vice, of the former, by enabling her to
withh6ld her property from being levied on and sold for the pay.
ment of his debts, or squandered by him against her wishes.
Before the passage of this law, the husband became the owner,
by virtue of the marriage, of the personal .property held by the
wife at the date of tbhe marriage, or which came to her after-that
time, and was"reduced by the husband to possession, and he was
also seised of an estate,- during coverture, in lands held by the
wife in fee. This estate was in the eye of the law a freehold, as
it would continue during their joint lives, and might last during
his life, and was liable to be 'sold on execution against the husband: 2 Kent 136. The personal property reduced to possession,
and this estate in the wife's land, were at the disposal of the husband, and liable to be sold at his pleasure, for his own use, or to
be levied upon and sold by his creditors. These were the evils
which the law was designed to cure and has cured. Although we
held in Bose v. Sanderson, 38 fI1. 247, that where the husband's
estate in the wife's lands had vested before the passage of this
law, it was not divested by the act, and might be sold by his creditors, yet where the marriage has occurred, or the land has been
acquired by the wife since that time, it would, doubtless, be held
that this species of estate, known as an estate during coverture,
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has been substantially abolished, because its existence is wholly
irreconcilable with both the language and the objects of this law.
But besides this estate which the husband acquired, by virtue of
the marriage, in the lands of his wife, he also, if there was issue
of the marriage born alive, became tenant by the courtesy of all
lands of the wife which such issue might, by possibility, inherit"
and this estate, unlike -the other, terminated only with his own
life. The law termed this estate initiate on the birth of issue, and
consummate only on the death of the -wife ; but 'the initiate
estate could be seized and sold on execution, against the husband.
Up to the period of the wife's death, it was substantially the same
thing as the estate during doverture above mentioned. Now,
although this estate is greatly molified by the Act of 1861, it is
not totally destroyed. During the life of the wife, the husband
can exercise no control over his wife's lands as tenant by .the
courtesy, nor has he an interest in them subject to execution. We
refer, of course,' to lands where no interest had vested before the
passage of the law. This estate, then, would be totally abolished,
like the estate during coverture, were it not that tenancy by the
courtesy continued after the wife's death, and indeed at that
period became most material to the husband, since, up to thatCime, he had the enjoyment of his wife's 'realty by virtue of the
other species of estate. While, then, the one estate is annihilated
by a necessary implication, the utmost that can be said' in regard
to the other is, that it is materially modified. This estate is as
)ld as the common law. It has always -been recognised as existIng in this state.' It is not expressly abolished, by the Act of
1861, and, so far from being abolished by implication,'it may-be
recognised as taking effect on the death of the wife, without conflicting, in the slightest degree, with the letter, spirit, or 'object
of that law. On the'contrary,'thd law itself provides, that it is
"during coverture" that the property of the wife is clothed with
these new qualities, thus leaving the existing law unchanged, as
to the disposition of the wife's property at her-death. Moreover,
it is hardly to be supposed that 'the legislature would totally
abolish- this estate, Without remodelling that of dower; or tha
they would work so important a change' in our law of realty,
merely by implication. But, in fact, there is not even an impli.
nation that affects this estate after'the death of the wife.
We have said this much in regard to this estate, as a, foundaVOL. XVI.-31
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tion for our opinion that this act does not enable the wife to '.on
vey her land without the consent of her husband manifested by
joining in the deed.
At common law the wife could only convey by fine or a common recovery, and a fine levied without the husband was not binding upon him : 2 Kent's Cora. 150. A conveyance in which the
husband unites has been substituted in this country, and is the
mode pointed out by the 17th section of our statute of conveyances. The estate of the husband in the wife's lands could not
therefore be destroyed or impaired by the sole act of his wife. If
this section of our Conveyance Act is repealed by the Act of
1861, it is repealed by implication, which, as already remarked,
the law does not favor. But where is the implication? Not cer-'
tainly in the language of the act, which gives .the wife, the. right
to hold, own, possess, and enjoy her property, 'for these terms
give only the jus tenendi, and not the jug disanenidi. The
power to own and enjoy, is entirely different from the power tG
dispose of, and the latter is not necessary to the exercise of the
former. Neither is the power of disposing implied in that phrase
of the law directing that her property shall be under her sole control, because that term, although indefinite, must be construed in
connection with the terms, 11own, hold, possess, and enjoy." In
order that she may hold and enjoy, she must; necessarily control.
But the control of the use and enjoyment does not imply the
pow~r to sell. Strictly speaking, the land, when conveyed, wouldpass away from her control and enjoyment.
But the chief reliance seems to be placed on the provision that
she is to have the power of controlling and enjoying as if she
were sole and unmarried, and hence it is contended that she can
convey as if she were sole, and her deed would have the same
effect as the deed of a feme sole. If she can convey at all,
because of the language in the act referring to the condition of
a feme sole, her deed would undoubtedly have this effect, and
would thus destroy the husband's estate by courtesy, and prevent
him from recovering possession of the lands conveyed after her
death.
We have already given the reason why this act does not anni.
hilate the estate of a tenant by the courtesy, or place it in the
power of a wife to destroy it. If we are right* in that conclusion, it necessarily follows that it was not the intention of the
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legislature, when they gave her the power to enjoy as a feme sole,
to give also the right to convey as a feme sole, and thereby destroy the husband's estate.
There is another reason for not holding that this act enables
the wife to convey by her own deed. Before the passage of the
law, acts similar in their general character had been passed in
several of our sister states. The law of New York expressly
gave the wife the power of conveyance.
The laws of Pennsylvania and New Jersey did not, but employed terms of the same general character as our own. Our
legislature chose to shape our law after the latter models. It is
but a just inference that the omission of any words, in our act,
expressly giving the power to convey, was the result of design,
and not of accident.
The Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have
given to the acts of those states the same construction ,adopted
in this opinion :"Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. State Rep. 410; Naylor v. Field, 5 Dutch. 287.
We should add, in conclusion, that we have not considered the
question of the power of the wife to dispose of her personal property. That may depend upon different considerations. The
power to sell has sometimes been consideed a necessary incident
to the ownership of personal property.
But a majority of the court are of opinion that the Act of 1861
does not authorize a married woman to convey her realty in"
any
other *manner than that pointed out by the Statute of Conveyances. In holding this, however, we do not question the rule
laid down in Emerson v. Clayton, 82 Ill. 898, as to the right-of
a married woman to bring a suit in her -own name. That right is
a necessary incident to the law.
As the decision of this questiofi disposes of this case, it is unnecessary to consider the other, questions raised , The judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded.
BREESE, C. 1., dissents.

RE SHEPARD.

United States District Court, Northern District of New York.
MATTER OF LUTHER SHEPARD, A BANKRUPT.'
A debt against a bankrupt's estate may be proven before a United States commissioner, although the bankrupt and creditor both reside in the same judicial
district.
A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations of the state in which the bankrupt
V resides may still be proven'againqt his estate in ban rupty.
A creditor who, after making his deposition to prove his debt, retains possession
of the deposition and does not allo, it to pass into the hands of the assignee in
bankruptcy, is not a rreditor who has proven his dlebt.
Any creditor of a bankrupt inay oppose the discharge, whether he have proven

his dibt or n6t.

THIS case came on to be heard upon the petition of the bankrupt for "a full diqcharge from all his debts, and a certificate
thereof."
At the time fixed for showing cause against the discharge two
of the bankrupt's creditors, whose debts were set forth in the
schedules annexed to his original petition, entered their appear.anee, and proposed to contest his right to a discharge; where upon, it was objected that they were not " creditors who had
proven their debts," and, consequently, had no right to be heard.
It was also insisted that the alleged debts, -which such creditors
had attempte4 to prove, were barred by the Statute of Liniita
tions of New York, where such debtor and creditors resided; and that, such alleged debts being so barred by the statute, the
parties appearing were not creditors, and had no right to contest
the bankrupt's discharge.
It was conceded that a deposition in proper form for the proof
of the debt of one of the creditors had been made before a commissioner appointed by the Circuit Court, and that such deposition
had been duly transmitted to the assignee ; but it was insisted
that the commissioner had no authority to take proof of such
debt, inasmuch as the creditor was, at the time, a resident Gf this
judicial district.
George Gorham, for the bankrupt.
E. W. Gardner, Jr., for the creditors.
'Weare indebted to Hon. N. K. HAT.L for this case.-EDS. Ax. Liw Rou
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HALL, D. J.-I. The question presented is not free from doubt.
The 22d section of the Bankrupt Act declares "that all proofs
of debts against the estate of the bankrupt, by or in behalf of
the creditors residing within the judicial district ihere the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending, shall be made before one of
the registers of the court in said district, and by or in behalf of
non-resident creditors before any register in bankruptcy in the
judicial district where such creditors, or either of them, reside,
or before any commissioner of the Circuit Court authorized to
administer oaths in any district."
There is, in the language of this provision, no clear indication
that Congress intended that the right to prove their debts before
a coiiimissioner should be confined- to creditors not residing within
the judicial district in which the proceedings were pending. The
sentence is punctuated by commas only, so that we have not even
the indication of that intention which would have been given if a
semicolon, instead of a comma, had been inserted after the words
"said district ;" but on the other hand there is not the indication
of a different intention which would have been given if a semicolon, instead of a comma, had been inserted 'after the word
'5Teside." So far as the punctuation, the particular language, or
the grammatical construction of the" sentence furnishes any evidence of the intention- of Congress in respect to this question, it
is more favorable to the construction which would sustain, the
authority of the commissioner in this case than to the opposite
construction; for the concluding portion of the sentence is, in
these respects, as closely connected with the first portion of the
sentence as-with the second or middle portion. It is true that the
'concluding portion of the sentence is separated from the portion
of it which provides for the propf :of debts by resident creditors,
but this separation furnishes' no reliable evidence that Congress
intended to deny to resident creditors the right to prove their
debts before a commissioner, for the connection of the three pro.
visions in one seiitence necessarily requlred that the interposition
of those placed first and last should'be separated by the oth6r.
The 'intent to require" all proofs made before registers tW 1e
taken before a register of the judibial district in which the creditor resides, is clearly expressed; and it is probable that the
concluding lines of the sentence, which- authorize proof before
commissiouers, were added by way of amendment,-perhaps by
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another hand,-without a careful consideration of their import
when connected with the preceding provisions. The difference
bietween the concluding provision and the two preceding ones, is
trongly marked. In the first two of these provisions the authority of the registers is expressly limited by the words "in said
district," in the one case, and by the words "in the judicial district where such creditors or either of them reside," in the
nther ; but no words* of limitation are found in this concluding
provision. On the contrary, there are very clear indications that
this provision was intended to be more general and comprehensive ;
for the unlimited term any/is twice used, first in reference to the
commissioner, ancl again in reference to the district. If it was,
not intended to give a creditor residing in the judicial district
where the proceedings are pending, the right to prove his debt
before a commissioner, it would seem that the right would have
been limited by the use of the words "1in said district," at the
conclusion of this sentence, as had been done in the first clause;
but instead of.this the general words "1in any district," are used.
And these words, which conclude the sentence, can have no legal
effect unless they are held to give the alternative right to resident
as well as to non-resident creditors. If the words "in any district" had been omitted, this right would still have been clear as
to non-resident creditors, though more doubtful than it now is in
respect to creditors residing within the judicial district where the
proceedings are pending. This alternative right to prove debts
before a commission, was doubtless conceded for the convenience
of creditors ; and the reasons of couvenience which required it
to be extended to non-resident creditors equally required its extension to resident creditors also. So far -as the convenience of'
the creditor is concerned, it is immaterial whether the debtor's
petition is pending in the judicial district in which the creditor
resides or in another district..
If it be suggested that Congress may have desired to secure
to the registers, rather than to the commissioners, the fees for
taking such proofs, the ready answer is, that if such a desire was
allowed to influence the action of Congress in respect to resident
creditors, it is impossible to assign any satisfactory reason for
limiting its influence to the case of resident creditors, instead
of extending it to both resident and non-resident creditors.
These considerations seem to require that the provisions of the
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istatute should be so construed as to give this alternative right to
resident as well as to non-resident creditors. And I adopt this
more willingly, as a different construction would invalidate the
proof of many debts taken in good faith before commissioners,
when the creditors were residents of the distripte in which the
proceedifigs were pending ; for the more liberal construction has
bpen frequently, if not generally, given to this provision by registers and commissioners, as well as by practitioners in bankruptcy.
Indeed, in the present case, it was shown by affilavit that the
proof was made before a commissioner, under the advice of the
register having the case in charge, that the creditor, though resident in this district, might make proof of his debt before a commissioner as well as before the register.
The proof referred to will be held sufficient, and the creditor
regarded as one who has.proved his debt and is entitled to oppose
the discharge.
H. Before reaching the conclusion just stated, I have neces.

-

sarily considered the objection that the "debts of the opposing
creditors were barred by the New York Statute of Limitations.
This statute (like the Statutes of Limitations of most of the
states of the Union) does not, in terms, provide that the debt
shall be extinguished by the lapse of time required to constitutethe statute a defence to an action brought in the courts of New
York, and it is a good defence only when spebially set up by
answer as a defence to an action broiught in this state. The
statute, therefore, simply affects the remedy, and it leaves the
creditor at liberty to pursue in another state any remedy authprized by thd'laws of that state.
It is believed that iAi some of the states, as in Iowa (Code of
1850), Indiana (Civil Code, 185.2), and in Ohio (Rev. Stat..
1854), it is provided by statute that actions shall not be brought
on demands barred by the Statutes of Limitations of the states
where the cause of action arose ; and in somestates the statute
may, in terms, pirovide that the debt shall be extinguished by the
lapse of time; but the statute of this state contains no such provision, and it does not purport to extinguish or destroy the ddbt;
and such is doubtless the case in all, or nearly all, of the states
of the Union..
That the operation of such statutes does not annul or extin
guish the debt, but only affects the remedy, and that such statutes
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have no effect out of the state in which they are passed, will
sufficiently appear upon an examination of the following au.
thorities :Bawls v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 86 Barb. 357; McElmoyle v.
Cohen, 13 Peters 312; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407 ; Uans
v. Frank, 86 Barb. 320; Power v. Hathaway, 42 Id. 214; Buggies v. Keeler, 8 Johns. 263; Bulger v. Roche, 11 Pick. 89;
Dwight v. Clark, 7 Mass. 515; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns.
Ch. Rep. 190; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 472; Byrne v.
Crowningskield, 17 Mass. 55; and .Medbury v. Hopkins, 3
Conn. 472.
And see Olcott -v. Tioga Railroad Co., 29 N. Y. 210; -1
Kent's Com. (10th ed.) 261, 262, and notes; and Story's
Conflict of Laws,.§§ 576, 577, 582.
The debt then exists, and in most of the states of the Union
an action can be sustained against the debtor, if found within
their jurisdiction.' This right of the creditor, considering the
migratory habitsof our people, and their known propensities to
travel from state to state, is a valuable right which would be
barred by the discharge; and I shall concur in the opinion of my
learned brother of the Southern District upon this question
(Matter of Kay, ante p. 283), and hold that the fact that this
creditor's iemedy for his debt, by suit in New York, is barred- by
the Statute of*Limitations, does not prevent the proof of. such
debt, or bar his right to. oppose the discharge of the bankrupt.
It must be conceded that the question is'not free from embarrassment, and that it has been differently d'eided by the learned
judge of the Massachusetts District (Re Kingslq, ante p. 423),
who relied, in part at least, upon the English decisions. In that
country it has been settled, after much conflict of judicial opinion, that a debt barred by the English Statute of Limitations is
not provable in their bankruptcy courts: Ex parte Dawdney, 15
Ves. 498; 1 Christian's Bankruptcy 221, and notes; biLt the
-ircumstances under which the question was decided there are
very different from those under which it is presented here. 'Their
Statute of Limitations and their Bankruptcy Act exist by the
same* legislative authority, and the operation of the statute is,
territorially, co-extensive with the proper force and operation of
the Bankruptcy Act; but in the United States'statutes of limitations have no. effect beyond the territory of the single state
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which enacts them; while a discharge in bankruptcy, under the
laws of the United States, operates with equal force in every
state of the Union.
The English Statute of Limitation operating throughout the
whole of England, and it being there held that a foreign creditor
(one whose debt was contracted and to be paid elsewhere than
in England, whether in the United States, France, Germany, or
an English or foreign colony) would not, even when suit for its
collection was brought in an English court, be barred by a discharge in bankruptcy granted in England, unless the foreign
creditor voluntarily made himself a party to the proceeding
(Eden on Bankruptcy 422, 423; Smith v. Buchanan, 1-East 6)
there" is much reason for the adoption of the English rule there
which does not apply here.
Our own courts hold that a bankrupt discharge in a foreign
country does not discharge a debt made in and with reference to
the laws of this country: Green v. Sarmiento, Peters 0. 0.
Rep. 74; Zanie's Case, 1 N.-Y. Leg. Obs. 40, note, agreeing in
this respect with the English doctrine.
It may also be conceded that the propriety of allowing debts
barred by the statute to be proved in bankruptcy may be opposed
by much force of argument, by reason of the apparent injustice
of allowing it in particular cases ; but, on the other hand, argumaents of at least equal force may be urged against the opposite
rule. In respect to questions arising under statutes of limita.
tions, the lez feri prevails, and if the statutes of the state in
which .the bankruptcy proceedings are pending are to-furnish the
rule of limitation, the New England creditors, by simple contraict
of a bankrupt who. has -resided in this state for five years, or for
only five months, may prove their debts of twelve years' standing, when, if he had not changed his residence, they would not
have been provable ; and a bankrupi who resided and was largely
indebted to relatives in New Jersey, where the Statute of Limi.
tations would be a good' bar, might carry on business for four
months in the city of. .New York and then present his petitibn in
bankruptcy there, and allow all his New.Jersey creditors who§e
debts were barred by their Statute -of Limitations to prove their
debts. Again, the states may at any time modify their statutes
of limitations; ind if the state of Wisconsin or Virginia should
provide by statute that no action for any debt, or for 'ny debt
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due to a resident of another state, should be maintained after six
months from the time the cause of action accrued, would the act
be binding upon the United States Bankruptcy Courts ? Or if a
state should pass an act that no debt should be proved in bankruptcy proceedings in that state after the expiration of six months
from the time the debt accrued, would the. Bankruptcy Courts
regard such an act ? The adoption of the Statutes of Limitation
of the particular state in which the proceedings in .bankruptcy
are pending, would in many. cases give the bankrupt the power to
-determine whether the statute should- or should not be a bar by
remaining a resident of -the state where he had long resided, and
whose Statute of Limitation would be a good bar, or by removing.
to and making his application in another state, where the statute
would be no bar.
But it is unnecessary to pursue this line of argurnlnt. "The
real question is,
whether a debt against which the Statute of Limitations of this state has run is still a deb.t, and that it is there can
be no doubt. .If it is still a debt, there is no statute of the state
or of the United Stateu which provides that it shall not be proved
or allowed in proceedings in bankruptcy'; and until some statute
of limitations shall be adopted by Congress for the guidance of
courts of bankruptcy, no uniform or satisfactory rule of limitation can be applied by those courts.- And even if they could
devise a uniform and satisfactory rule, i can find no authority for
those courts to provide, or adopt from the statutes of the state,
any such rule of limitation.
III. In respect to the claims of the other opposing creditor, it
was shown that he had appeared before the. register having thiR
case in charge, and had made a deposition, drawn up by th6
register himself, in the proper form for the proof of such creditor's debt, but that such deposition had been retained in the
hands of the creditor-or his attorney, and had never been delivered
or sent to the assignee. It also appeared that the creditor had
.afterwards commenced a suit against the bankrupt for the purpose
of obtaining a judgment in a state court for the amount of his
debt, and had retained possession of the deposition' referred to
until it was filed with the clerk at the time of entering his appearance in opposition to the bankrupt's discharge. It was insisted,
upon this state of facts, that the court ought not-to 4llow the cre.
ditor to oppose the bankrupt's discharge.
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The 22d section of the Bankrupt Act, after prescribing the
manner and form of making the proof of a debt by deposition,
further provides as follows: "If the proof is satisfactory to the
register or commissioner, it shall be signed by the deponent, and
delivered or sent by mail to the assignee, who shall examine and
compare it with the books and accounts of the bankrupt, and shall
register, in a book to be kept for that purpose, the names of creditors who have proved their claims," &c.; and it is evidently the
intention of the act that the register or commissioner taking the
proof shall decide, in the first instance, upon the sufficiency of the
Proof. If the proof is satisfactory, the officer is to deliver it to
the assignee, or send it to him by mail; and this act of the officer
is the only evidence that the proof is satisfa ctory which has been
provided for, either by the statute or the, general orders and forms
prescribed by the jus. ices of the Supreme Court. The return: of
the depositi6n to the creditor, when entirely unexplained, would
seem to indicate that the proof was not satisfactory; or else that
the creditor did not intend to complete his proof and become
thereby a " creditor who had proved his debt;" and the subsequent act ot the creditor in commencing a suit against his debtor
(which, under the 21st section of the act, he had no right to do
if he had proved his debt) is primd facie evidence that the proof
was not satisfactory to the- register, or else that the creditor did
not intend, by making the deposition, to become a creditor.who
had proved his debt.
Under the circumstances stated, I am of the opinion that the
creditor, who has now filed the deposition with the clerk, cannot
be considered as "a creditor who has proved his debt," within
the technical meaning, of those terms'as used in the Bankrupt
Act.
IV. If this conclusion is correct, the question.arises whether a
person who shows, by affidavit or otherwise, that he is a creditor
of the bankrupt, has a right to appear and oppose his discharge
without being, in technical strictness, "a creditor who has proved
Jhis debt 2"
This' question is one -of great importance and in respect to
which there is much difference of opinion. It was stated on the
argument that the learned judge of the Southern District of New
York had decided against this right; and. I am aware that others,
-whose opinions are entitled to great respect,.have expressed similar
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It is probable that in making his decision Judge

BLATCHFORD relied upon the decision of his learned predecessor

in King's Case, to which I shall presently refer. I have carefully examined that case and other authorities, and after a careful
consideration of the provisions of the present Bankrupt Act I have
reached a conclusion different from that announced by the learned
judge of the Southern District. While I regret this difference
of opinion, my own'convictions are so strong that I feel bound to
decide the question in accordance with such convictions, and to
state my reasons therefor; and then to leave it to Congress to
settle the question by legislation, if such legislation shall be deemed
expedient.

In discussing the question thus presented, it is proper first to
consider the nature and object of the proceeding which requires
it&determination.
The question can only arise upon the application of a bankrupt
for a judicial discharge from all his debts, 'and these -applications
are to be grauted ind most cases without even a partial performance of the legal obligations of the bankrupt. The application is
to be granted or denied by a court, in the regular course of judicial proceedings, and.the discharge, if it be properly obtained, is
a conclusive bar to any suit prosecuted for the collection of a debt,
provable against the bankrupt's estate, which existed at the-time
of the filing of his original petition.
That all creditors whose rights may thus be conclusively barred
by the decision of a court of justice, should have the right to be
heard in opposition to such decision, is a proposition so plain and
self-evident, that it would seem that its obvious truth would be at
once admitted alike by lawyers and laymen without the thought
that either argument or authority might be requisite for its maintenance. If authorities were required it would be easy to produce them in great numbers, and from the highest sources ; but
two or three will suffice. In the case of The Mary, 9 Cranch 126,
134, Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, said: "1It is a principle of
natural justice, of universal obligation, that before the rights of
an individual be bound by a judicial sentence he shall have notice,
either actual or constructive, of the proceedings against him."
But notice to a party is worthless, unless he has the privilege
of being heard; and Mr. Justice* STORY) in Bradstreet v. The
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.Yeptune Insurance Oompany, 3 Sumner 600, 607, said: "1It is
a rule founded in the first principles of natural justice that a party
shall have an opportunity to be heard in his defence before his
property is condemned," &c. In the case of Hollingsworth v.
Barbour, 4 Peters 466, it was declared by Mr. Justice TRIMBLE
at the circuit, p. 472, that " by the general law of the land, no
court is authorized to render a judgment or decree against any
one or his estate, until after due notice by service of process to
appear and defend." And he added: "fThis principle is dictated
by natural justice ; and is only to be departed from in cases
expressly warrantedby law, and excepted out of the generalrule."
And he further declared, p. 475, that the reason of the rule that
judgments and decrees are binding only on parties and privies
"is founded on the immutable principles of Justice that no man's
right should be prejudiced by the judgment or decree of a court
without an opportunity (f defending the right," &c. ; and all this
was concurred inby the Supreme Court, p. 470.
In view of the principles thus sanctioned by the highest authority it would seem to be a reproach to the national legislature to
hold that it 'was intended that any creditor whose claims would
be barred by a discharge should be deprived of his just right to
lie heard, in opposition to such discharge ;'and certainly an intention to violate those principles of natural justice, and deny the
creditor's right to be heard, should not be impqted to Congress
unless such intention is clearly expressed, or must necessarilyr' be
implied from the language of the statute': Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Peters 472. It is certain that no such intentiQn is clearly
expressed in the Bankrupt Act now in force, and it is belie'ed
that nb such intention can be reasonably inferred from any of its
provision8.
But before discussing these proiisions it may'be proper to refer
to the provisions of the Act of 1841, and to the decision under
that act made by the learned, judge who then presided in the
Southern District of New York, and which, it is supposed, led to
the decision lately made by his successor, under-the Act of 1867.
In the case of Brown King, 1 N. Y. Legal Observer 2.1, s. v.
5 Law Rep. 320, Judge BETTs decided that, under the Bankrupt
Act of 1841, a creditor who had no interest, except in that character, and who had not proved his' debt, could not be permitted
to oppose a bankrupt's discharge.

494

RBE SHEPARD.

That case was decided upon the 4th section of the Act of 1841,
which provided that no discharge should be granted "until after
seventy days' notice in some public newspaper, designated by such
court, to all creditors who have proved their debts, and other persons in interest, to appear at a particular time and place to show
cause why such discharge and certificate shall not be granted ; at
which time and place any such creditors, or other person in interest, may appear and -contest the right of the bankrupt thereto ;"
and it was upon this language that Judge BETTS held that credit.ors, "as such, could not rightfully appear in the controversy, but
must have the further qualification of having proved their debts."
-It
is clear that there was no express exclusion of the right of
the creditor who had not proved 'his debt by the lantguage of the
4th section abov equoted. Stich a creditor was a person in inter
est, and as he was not embraced in the class of "creditors who
* have proved their debts," he was, by the ordinary rulbs of construction. embraced in the other class of "other persons in interest."

In the case of Tebbets, 5 Law Reporter 259, Mr. Justice STORY
said in respeci to parties opposing a discharge: "If they are not
strictly, in the sense of the law, creditors of the bankrupt, they
are at least equitable creditors ;" and declaring'that their claims
would be enforced in a court of equity, he allowed them to oppose
the discharge, although (as I understand the case) they were not
"cr ditors who had proved their debts."
In the case of Book, .3McLean's Rep. 317, Mr. Justice Mo
LEAN, in commenting upon and overruling the.case of King, said:
"In the matter of Brown King, Southern District of New York',
5 Law Rep. 820, it was held that the terms ' other persons in interest,' used in the 5th section, are employed to designate those
who could not prove debts as creditors, and does not embrace,
but excludes, creditors. That these words may embrace those
who are not properly creditors but have an interest in the matter, may be admitted; but that they exclude creditors who have
not proved their debts, is a gratuitous assumption not warranted
.by law."
In Haxtun v. Corse, 2 Barb. Ch.Rep. 506, 529, the decision
in Brown 'King's Case was commented upon by the late Chancel!or WALWORTH, and that eminent jurist expressed the opinion that
Judge BETTS'S decision was " an erroneous construction of the

RE SHEPARD.

statute" * * * "and that the framers of the law intended to give
all persons interested in opposing the bankrupt's discharge, as
well as creditors who had proved their debts against him, the
privilege of appearing and contesting his right to such a discharge."
Under the provisions of the same section of the Act of 1841,
it is clear that any creditor of the bankrupt, whether he had
proved his debt or not, might impeachl the discharge (when
pleaded as a defence to the suit of such creditor) for fraud or
wilful concealment which might have been urged in opposition to
the discharge; and if Judge BETTS's decision is correct, a
creditor who, under this same section, could not oppose the action
of the court in granting the discharge when applied for, could
defeat such action aftgr the discharge had'been granted. This
would be absurd, and I cannot but think that, both upon reason
and authority, it may be properly assumed that Judge BETTS'S
decision in .K~ig's Case was a hasty and erroneous construction
of the Act of 1841.
But the reasoning -upon which Judge BETTS based his opinion
in King's Case is not applicable to a case arising -under the exist,
ing Bankrupt Act. It may be conceded that the. 29th section of
ihe present act, -which provides for notice to show cause against
a discharge, carefully provides for notice to creditors who have
proved their debts, and that it does not contain.any very clearly
.expressed provision for giving notice, in terms, to any other"parties. It provides that the court shall order notice of an application for a discharge "1to be given by mail to all creditors who
have proved their debts' and by publication at least once -a w ek
in such newspapers as the court shall designate, due regard being
had to the general circulation of the same in the district, or Iin
that portion of the district in whicli the bankrupt and his creditors
reside, to appear on a, day appointed for that purpose and show
cause," &c. Now, though it is not expressly stated that notice
must be given to any creditors except those who have proved
their debts, it is clearly to be inferred that the publication of the
notices-is required for the benefit of other creditors; for this
publication is in addition to the personal notice required to be
given by mail to all creditors who have proved their debts, and
in providing for- the designation of the newspapers in which the
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publication is to be made, reference is made to the creditors
generally, and not alone to those who have proved their debts.
It will also be observed that in this section no reference is made
to " other persons in interest ;" but the more important, and
under Judge BETTS's decision the vitally important difference
between the Acts of 1841 and 1867 is that in the Act of 1867
there is, in immediate connection with these "provisionsfor giving
notice, no provision declaring the right of "creditors who have
proved their debts and others in interest," to appear and oppose
.the discharge, as was the case in the Act of 1841. The last of
these omissions is supplied by the 31st section of the present
-Bankruptcy Act, .which provides "that. ANY CREDITOR opposing
.the discharge of a bankrupt may file a specification in writing of
:the -grounds of his opposition ;". thus providing f6r opposition by
A' any creditor,'' and not by any creditor who has proved his
debt, as in the Act of 1841. This is a very important change
:from the language.of the Act of 1841; und if the-decision in
King's Case was not erroneous it is n&t an authority against the
-right .of the creditor in this case, for the term any creditor .can
-by no just construction be limited to a creditor who has proved
'his debt.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Acts of 1841 and 1867,
which are. apparently intended to give permission to creditors, or
-to creditors and others in interest, to appear and oppose a dischar'ge, it is very clear under the authorities before cited and'
many others of a similar character, that -the courts in administering these acts would have allowed such opposition if no such permission had been expressly given; and .in order to bar the creditor's right to appear and oppose the discharge the bankrupt
must show that such right has been taken away by the.statute,
either in express terms or by necessary implication : Hollingsworth
v. Barbour, 4 Peters 466. As has been shown, the Act of 1867,
in the sections which bear upon this question, only speaks of creditors who have proved their debts in the -one case, and.creditors
generally in the other; and yet Form No. 51 prescribed, by the
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States very properly
provides for notice to all creditors who have proved their debts
"and other persons in interest;" although "other persons in
interest" are not embraced in any of the provisions of the act
relating to the application for a discharge, the notice to show

. RE SHEPARD.

cause against the .same, or the opposition to be made to such
application. Parties who are not creditors are, therefore, to be
permitted to oppose a discharge upon principles of justice universally acknowledged by the courts of all civilized countries, and
not under any permission given by the Bankrupt Act.
But it may be said that without any express provision of the
statute, or any necessary implication from its language, the Bankruptcy Courts should require a creditor to show his interest in the
proceedings by proving his debt before 'allowing him a standing
in court for the purpose of opposing a discharge ; and that requiring him to take the position of a creditor who has proved his debt
is no denial of the right which has been declared to be founded
in the principles of natural justice, for the reason that such
requirement is easily fulfilled. It is conceded that proof of his
interest, if it does not clearly appear by the schedules of the
bankrupt, may properly be required of the creditor; but it being
cbrtain that a party, in order to become a creditor who has proved
his debt, must in many cases relinquish most important rights, and
that to impose upon the creditor, unnecessarily, any injurious
"fernis, as a condition of his being heard, is as inconsistent with
the principles of justice, and, to the extent of the- injury inflicted
by the imposition.of such conditions, as gioss a denial of the just
rights of the creditor as an absolute- refusal to allow him to be
heard, he ought not to be required to become, technically, "a
creditor who has proved his debt." Very injurious terms will
certainly be imposed in many cases if it be held that a party must
take the position of a "creditor who has proved his debt' against
the estate of the bankrupt before tie can oppose his discharge. 'In
many cases in which the application 'for a discharge" is made at
the end bf sixty days under section 29, on the ground that nc
assets have come to thehands of the assignee, it-will (under the
provisions of section 20) lie impossible for the creditor to prove
his debt, without relinquishing -his lien by judgment or mortgage,
at any time before the day fixed for the final hearing on the application for a discharge.
By*section 20, it is provided that "when a creditor has A mortgage or pledge of real or personal property of the bankrupt, or a
lien thereon for securing the payment of a debt owing to him
from the bankrupt, he shall be admitted as creditor only for the
balance of the debt after deducting the value of such pioperty,
VOL. XVI.:-32
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to be ascertained by.agreement between him and the assignee, or
by a sale thereof, to be made in such manner as the court shall
direct; or the creditor may release or convey his claim to the
assignee upon such property and be admitted to prove his whole
debt. * * * If the property is not so sold or delivered up,
the creditor shall not be allowed to prove any part of his debt."
By section 21, it is'provided that " no creditor proving his debt
or claim shall be allowed to maintain any suitat law or equity
therefor against the bankrupt, but shall be deemed. to have waived
-all right of action and suit against said bankrupt, and all proceedings already commenced, or unsatisfied judgments already
obtained, thereon -shall be deemed to be'discharged and sutrendered thereby, &c." Why should a creditor holding a mortgage
or judgment for.15,000, partiallysecured .by its lien on $10,000
worth of real oz; personal estate, and Who is willing that the -other
creditors of the bankrupt should take all of the propery of the
bankrupt which is not bound by this mortgage or judgment, *be*
compelled to relinquish his lien, before he is allowed to show fraud
on the.part of the bankrupt, and defeat his application for a discharge, in order to preserve the right to collect his debt out of
the subsequently acquired property of the bankrupt. It is quite
proper to require a creditor to prove a debt before allowing him
to make any motion in respect to the bankrupt's estate in the
hands of -theassignee ; but why should it be required by the. legislatu~e or by the courts, when the creditor only seeks to prevent'
the bankrupt's discharge ? That the legislature has not'expressly
required it is very blear, and there is strong reason for believing
that it was net intended to be required.
By the 85th section of the present act." any creditor or creditors of said bankrupt, whose debt was proved or provable against
the estate in bankruptcy, who shall see fit to contest the validity
of said discharge on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained,
may, at any time within two years after the date thereof; apply
to the court which granted it to set aside and annul'the same ;"
and there is no requirement that he shall prove his debt against
the bankrupt's estate. It would seem that to deny a creditor the
right to oppose the granting of a discharge because he had not
proved his debt, and then allow him to apply to the court which
granted it, to set it aside, at any time-within two years, without
proving such debt, would be grossly absurd.
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If the narrow construction which has been contended for is to
prevail and no effect is to be given to the 81st section of the present Bankrupt Act, it would seem that no one but a creditor who
has proved his debt can oppose a bankrupt's discharge, as other
persons in interest are not named in the act; and upon the same
principles of construction it may well be contended that only such
creditors as had proved their debts prior to the granting of the
order to show cause can be allowed to appear and make such opposition. I am satisfied that neither of these propositions can be
maintained; and after the fullest consideration I have been able
to give the whole subject, I am of the opinion that the construction given to the Act of 1841 by Mr. Justice McLEAN and Chancellor WALWORTH, and not that given by Judge BETTS .in'King'8
Case, was the proper construction of that act; and that under the
81st section of the present Bankrupt Act there is no sufficient
reason for deniying the right of the creditors, who have appeared
in this case, to contest the discharge of the bankrupt, even if it
be conceded that King's Case was properly decided. They will,
therefoie, be recognised as having a proper standing in court for
that puipose.

United States District Court-Western District of Penn8ylvarna.MATTER OF

OWEN BYRNE,

A BANxRUPT.

A bond Je transfer of partnership effects by one member of the partnership to
another vests the title in the transferee as his separate estate.
Where there are both joint and separate debts, proved in a bankruptcy on a separate petition, the joint cetditors are not entitled to 'articipate in the distribution of
the assets until the separate creditors are paid in full.
The exception in the general rule of law,-which allows joimt creditors to receive
dividends par passu with the separate creditors in cases where there is'no joint
estate and no solvent partner, is inoperative under the Bankrupt Law of 1867.
4 . transferred his interest in partnership effects to his copartner B., on the 2d
.of October, on his (B.'s) promise tb pay the firm debts; without buying any new
stock or making kiny effort to continue the business, B. filed his petition in bankruptey on the 7th of October: Add, that the transfer was accepted by B. in contemplation of filing his petition in bankruptcy, and that the transfer wias. void as Ia
fraud on the creditors of the partnership.

THIS was a case certified by the register for the opinion oi the
court.
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Owen Byrne, the bankrupt, had been in partnership with W. P.
Graham, in the hat business, in the city of Pittsburgh. On the 2d
day of October 1867, the firm was formally dissolved, Graham giving to Byrne " entire possession of the store fixtures and goods and
debts due the concern," and Byrne agreeing "to pay all the debts
and liabilities of the concern, and save Graham harmless from
liability therefrom."
Five days afterwards, Byrne filed his petition for adjudication
in bankruptcy. In the mean time, no new stock had been purchased, nor had Byrne made any effort, to continue the business.
Byrne was at the same time carrying on a separate trade as a
merchant tailor in -another part of the city.
In his inventory of assets, Byrne set out the stock formerly
belonging to the.partnership separately from the stwck of tailor's
goods. He also set -out book accounts due to the partnership
amounting to $186.85.
The assignee realized as follows: On the partnership stock
$1179.87, on the partnership debts $3.50, on the separate stock
$1387.11, and on the separate debts $95.75. There was yet some
separate real estate undisposed of.
Graham, the other member of the partnership, had also filed his
petition and .been adjudicated a bankrupt by this court, so that
there was no solvent partner.
J. 'f. Kennedy, for a separate creditor, contended that by tho
dissolution of the firm of Graham & Byme, the stock of -hats .became the separate estate of Byrne, and that- in the distribution of
the funds in the hands of the assignee, the joint creditors cannot
participate until the separate creditors have.been paid in full.
A .'1. Willer, for the joint creditors, contended that all the
assets in the hands of the assignee must be distributed among all
the creditors, joint and separate, pro rata, without priority or
preference, as provided in section 27 of the Bankrupt Law; that
the 36th section does not apply to this case, as it has reference
exclusively to the bankruptcy of partnerships existing at the time
of the presentation of the petition in bankruptcy, and that the
whole spirit and meaning of the Bankrupt Law is against pre.
ferences.
He further contended that if the court be of opinion that the
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joint creditors cannot participate with the separate creditors in
the distribution of the separate estate, that the circumstance of
the filing of the petition so soon after the dissolution, must render
the transfer of the partnership property to the sole possession of
Byrne void as a fraud upon the joint creditors.
The following questions were submitted:1. Does the transfer of partnership property by one partner to
another change the character of the property from joint to
separate
1 2. Can? the joint creditors share equally
with the separate
creditors in the distribution of the assets of one member of
a firh on a separate petition ?
-3. Is the assigninent by Graham to Byrne void as a fraud upon
the joint creditors ?
The' Register [SAMUEL HARPEP]-1. The first question has
been frequently adjudicated in England and in this country, and
it is well settled that a hondfide sale for valuable consideration.
by one partner to another, of all the partnership effects, vests the
sole title in the latter as his separate estate : Story on Part. 358,
372, and authorities there cited; Hilliard on" Bank. and Ins.-64,.
and cases cited; Robb v. Mudge, 14 Gray 504; Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553; Ensign v. Briggs, 6 Gray 329. This has
been held even when the firm and both partners were at the time
insolvent, more especially if the partners have no knowledge of
such insolvency; and in some cases it has been ruled that even
this knowledge would not avoid the transfer: Howe v. Laiwrence,
9 Cush. 553; t.parte Peake; 1 Madd. 846.
2. The principle involved in the second question has been liable
to great fluctuation. As early as the time of Lord Chancellor
HARDWICKE it was held that joint cdeditors might be admitted to
prove under separate commissions, for the purpose of assenting to
or dissenting from the discharge, but not to receive dividends
until after the separate creditors were paid in full. Chancellor
KENT, in Murray v. Murray, 5 John. Oh. 72, traced the, courde
of the English Equity decisions upon this point, and thought that
the rule just stated was just and reasonable, while Judge STORT,
in his work on Partnerhip, at section 882 says, "that it rests on
a foundation as questionable and unsatisfactory as any rule in the
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whole system of our jurisprudence," although he says that it is
for the public peace that it should be left undisturbed.
The rule, however, has been subject to three exceptions : First,
where a joint creditor is the petitioning creditor under a separate
fiat. Second, where there is no joint estate and no solvent part
ner. Third, where there are no separate debts.
The facts agreed upon by the parties to this certificate show
that there is no solvent partner,.but it is not agreed that there is
no joint estate. At the date of the dissolution there were debts
due the firm of Graham & Byrne ainounting to $186.85, and
although they were embiaced in the assignment yet it has beeih
held that such debts will remain in the order and disposition of
the partnership, and form part of the joint estate, unless lrior to
the bankruptcy, biotice of the assignment has been gien 'to the
debtors: Story on Part. § 403. Public notice in the Gaz6ttd
was held to be insufficient, and that the debts owing by those
debtors who had not express notice remained in the partneiship :.
Ex parte Usborne, 1 Glyn & Jam. 858. As the filing of the petitior followed so closely after the dissolution, it is not unreasonable
to hold that the debtors of the firm had not received expresi
notice prior to the bankruptcy. These debts then will constitute
a joint estate, to which the joint creditors must resort, and leave
the separate estate of the bankrupt to the separate creditors as
provided by the 86th section of the present Bankrupt Law.,
If there be any joint fund, however small, the assets, are to be
marshalled accordiing to the partnership rule, although the fund
may have been created by the separate creditdrs purchasing some
of the partnership assets actually worthless, for the purpose only
of creating it: In re Marwick, Davies 229. Where there was
joint estate to the amount of £13, it was held that the joint creditors could not receive -dividends from the separate estate until
all the separate creditors could be paid in full, although it did not
appear that after costs any amount of the £18 would remain for
distribution: -x parte Kennedy, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 150. Five
shillings has been held sufficient joint estate for this purpose.
But whether these debts are joint estate or not, it seems that
joint creditors are not entitled to dividends until the separate
creditors are paid in full. It is said that where an insolvency
statute adopts in terms the general rule (Is is the case in section
86 of the present Bankrupt Law), it is not only rigidly applied

MATTER OF BYRNE.

conformably to the practice in England, but the exception to the
rule already stated is held to be impliedly abrogated: Hilliard
on Bank. and Insolv. 69. In Howe v. JLawrence, 9 Cush. 559,
BIGELOW, J., said: "The statute recognises no such exception.
The rule is direct and peremptory. This provision was reported
and enacted with a full knowledge of the exception. The rule
may sometimes operate harshly ; but it is definite, clear, and easily
applied. The exceptions to it are artificial and refined, leading
to nice and subtle distinctions, and sometimes operating with great
inequality and injustice. Under such circumstances, we are
unwilling to adopt it into our jurisprudence." See also Somerset
v. Minot, 10 Cush. 597. These decisions were under the Insolvent"laws of Massachusetts which contain almost identically the
same provisions in regard to this rule as the present Bankrupt Law,
and are good authorities upon this question.
I am unable to see what bearing the provisions of the 27th section have upon this question. They do, it is true, prohibit preferences among creditors-the very essence of the bankruptcy
system ; but the 86th section enacts in terms the partnership rule,
and the two sections must be taken together. , When there is a
joint fund the joint creditors take it, and when there is a separate
fund the separate creditors take it ; And the 27th section merely
provides that when the creditors who are entitled to share in the
distribution have been determined, they shall take pro rata. -Prohibiting the joint creditors from sharing.in the separate estate; or
the contrary, is not a preference in favor of the separate or joint
creditors, as the case may be, denied by law, but an equitable
rule which the courts are to administer under the direction of the
law.
I had written thus far when' my. attention was drawn to a decision upon this question in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois: In re etewett, reported in the American Law
Register for March, p. 291., The syllabus is as follows: "Wheze
there are both individual and partnership creditors of a bankrupt,
but the assets are individual only, though mainly consisting of
goods purchased by the bankrupt from the partnership on-its'dis'solution prior to the bankruptcy, and being principally the same
goods in the purchase of which the partnership debts had originated ; the partnership creditors will be entitled to be paid vari
jpassu with the individual creditors." This decision does not, it

504

MATTER OF BYRNE.

seems to me, rest on the reason of either the rule or the exception
It did not appear that there was or was not a solvent partner and
joint estate, and the register ruled that inasmuch as the separate
creditors did not prove that there was a solvent partner and joint
estate, the joint creditors were entitled to dividends pari Passu
with the separate creditors. I submit as better reasoning that the
burden of proof was on the joint creditors to establish the facts
necessary to make thb exception operative as they sought to avoid
a well-settled rule of law and equity. But the register has overlooked the American decisions upon this question which I have
cited, and it seems clear-that the weight of authority preponderates greatly against his decision. I can perceive nothing in his
opinion to warrant me in modifying the views I have expressed.
Third. To pass "the title to partnership property to one member
of the firm, the transaction must be bond fide. If there be-want
of good faith sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud, equity will
declare the assignment void. It has already been seen that insolvency of the firm and of the members of it, and even a knowledge
of such insolvency by the partners, will not make the transaction
void. The circumstances of this case, however, are peculiar, and
so far as the law of bankruptcy is concerned I have not been able
to find a parallel to it in the books. But five days intervened
between the dissolution and the filing of the petition, and one was
a Sunday. Allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the
petitlon and schedules, the conclusion is almost irresistible that the'
bankrupt had in contemplation the filing-of his petition at the very
time he accepted the transfer of the partnership property. Surely
this consideration is sufficient to make the assignment void as .to
the joint creditors, and to return the procqeds arising from the
sale of the stock of hats, caps, and furs to the order and disposi.
tion of the partnership as joint estate.
The first and third questions are decided in the affirmative, and
Lhe second in the negative.
On the request of the parties the questions were certified to the
judge for his opinion.
MOCANDIESS, J.-The Register is clearly right upon the several
points presented, and his decision is affirmed.

BRADSHAW v. KLEIN.

United States -DistrictCourt, lDi8triet of Indiana.
BRADSHAW, AssiGNEE, &c., v. KLEIN.
An assignee in bankruptcy may maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor before he was adjudged a bankrupt, even though the convey-

ance v as before the passage of the Bankrupt Act.
Such aetion is not limited to conveyances made within six months of the filing
of the petition. The general language of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Act is
iot limited in this respect by the 35th section.

THIS was a bill in equity, filed by William A. Bradshaw,
assignee of Armsted M. Klein, a bankrupt, against Henry Klein
and others.
The bill charged that the bankrupt, before the passage of the
Bankrupt Act, transferred certain property to one John A. Klein,
without consideration, for the purpose of defrauding the bankrup's. creditors; that said John A. Klein, without consideration,
transferred the same to the defendants, who now claim title
thereto ; and that the bankrupt has ever retained, and now retains
possession of said property. And it prayed that the property be
made assets in the assignee's hands for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors.
The defendants demurred to the bill, and the only question
made in support of the demurrer was: Can the assignee 'of a
bankrupt maintain an action to recover back property conveyed
away by the bankrupt with intent to defraud his creditors ?
March, in support of the demurrer, argued that the assignee
takes such rights of action only as the debtor had before lie was
adjudged h bankruipt ; and that, as he could not have, sued, before
that adjudication to recover back property conveyed by him in
fraud of his creditors, so his-assignee cannot, afterwards, sue to
recover it back.
Bitter, for plaintiffs.
McDONALD, D. J.-There can be no doubt that a transfer of pioperty, made with intent to defraud -creditors, is valid as between
the parties to it; and that the seller having delivered over the
possession of th6 property, cannot recover it. To such a case the
maxim applies, that in par delicto potior est conditio rossidentis.
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And it is true that the 14th section of the Bankrupt Act transfers
to the assignee all the rights of property and of action previously
held by the bankrupt. But does the assignee represent the rights
of the bankrupt, and his rights only ? Does he not also represent
the rights of the creditors ?
It is very clear that, but for the adjudication of bankruptcy,
the creditors might subject to the payment of their debts property
conveyed by their debtor in fraud of their rights. But now,
since he is adjudged a bankrupt, this right is taken away from
them. The law will not allow them to sue at all for their debts.
And if the assignee cannot maintain an action to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside, and the property subjected to the pay
ment of debts due to creditors, there can be no remedy whatever

in such a case. So to decide, would altogether defeat the operation of the statutes against fraudulent conveyances in all cases of
bankrupt debtors. For if the ground assumed in support of the
demurrer be tenable, then a failing debtor iiiay to-day transfer all
his property with i-itent to defraud his creditors, and six months

hence be adjudged a bankrupt, without any power in any person
to reduce the property thus fraudulently conveyed to assets for
the payment of his debts. Courts ought to be very reluctant to
indulge a doctrine fraught with such consequences. Under the
Bankrupt -Act of 1841, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has,
indeed, held -this doctrine. But I have no hesitation in pro.
nouning that decision .erroneous. A very high authority; Judge
CURTIS, under the Act of 1841, decided differently. 'He held
that " there is a broad distinction betweeI a bill by a bankrupt,
the author of the fraud, and one by the assignee, who seeks to
recover the property for the benefit of the very interest sought to
be defrauded; and that the ground of refusing relief to the author
of the fraud is a principle of public policy, which forbids the
court to be auxiliary to a plan for evading the law and depriving
the creditors of their just and legal rights ; but that when the
assignee sues, the case is reversed-to grant the relief, is to act
in accordance with these rights of creditors and in opposition to
the contemplated fraud, while to refuse it, would be to aid in its
perpetration :" Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curtis' Rep. 230.
If, as Judge CURTIS held, under the Act of 1841, the assignee
of a bankrupt might maintain an action to set aside a frauduleut
conveyance made before that act was passed, the reason for allow-

